Abstract-Split factor is a fundamental consideration when designing a distribution substation earth grid. Arbitrary choice of split factor in earth grid design process may lead to technical and economic implications resulting in underestimated or overestimated designs. In this paper, a distribution substation earth grid was designed using SESCAD and executed in MALT module of CDEGS. The energization current was varied by 100%,75%,50% and 25% of the short circuit current available at the secondary terminals of the upstream transformer to determine the impact on safety criteria of the earth grid. Results indicated that, the EPR for 100% fault current was higher, whereas the step and touch voltages were lower. It was also revealed that, there was no difference in step and touch voltages when energization current was set at 75%, 50%
INTRODUCTION
Earthing in any substation is essential to ensure safety of human and animal life, to protect equipment against damage by over voltage, and to ensure a reliable power system operation. It consists of a complete set of measures used to establish an electrically conductive path to earth, and is mandatory in all electrical power networks both at high and low voltage levels. Effective earthing systems in a substation is required to limit touch and step voltages to safe values, enable efficient operation of protective devices, and to ensure good power quality and electromagnetic compatibility are maintained [1] . Considering these safety concerns, the primary objective of a substation earthing is to provide a means to disperse electric current into the soil under both normal and fault conditions without exceeding any operating and equipment limits, or adversely affecting continuity of service, to limit the earth potential rise (EPR) of the substation earth 978-1-4799-3544-4/14/$31.00 ©2014 IEEE 762 2M. Osman
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grid to an acceptable value for any possible fault condition, limit the resulting step, touch, and transfer potentials in and around the substation to an acceptable value, ensure that a person in the vicinity of grounded facilities is not exposed to the danger of critical electric shock, and to minimize the surface potentials which is approximately proportional to the EPR which are both determined by the current flow from the earth grid to the surrounding soil [2] . The earth grid must also be designed and installed to withstand corrosion and mechanical stress during the entire lifetime of the installation, and it must be able to withstand the expected thermal stress from fault currents [3] .
The major challenge encountered by power system engineers during substation earth grid design is the arbitrary choice of split factor which has significant technical and cost
implications. An overstated fault current can result in an uneconomical substation earth grid design. Therefore, it is very important to know the maximum current that will flow to earth through the grid for various possible earth fault locations. For instance, in the event of a low frequency power system fault such as phase to earth, phase to phase or three phase to earth, the total fault current that is assumed to flow through the substation earth grid may be typically larger than the current discharged into the soil. However, part of the fault current will return to remote sources and local transformer neutral through the shield wires of transmission lines, neutral and shields of distribution feeders and conductors of the earth grid. Only the current discharged into the soil through the earth grid would affect the EPR. Therefore, accurate choice of split factor is very important for the design and performance of a substation earth grid [4, 5] .
Another issue related to the choice of split factor is the configuration of the distribution system. In the event of an earth fault occurring on an overhead distribution network with earthed neutral, the fault current returns to the earthed neutral through tower structures and footing, earth return paths and earth wires, thus flowing through multiple parallel paths [6] .
These parallel paths will cause the fault current to be divided into multiple paths to complete the return path to the source.
In such cases, the calculated level of fault current may well be considerably greater than the actual current that will flow through the earth grid. Therefore, ignoring the parallel paths and only considering these high fault current levels could result in an over design of the substation earth grid [4] .
Conversely, if an earth fault occurs along a distribution substation fed by a cable line, a very large percentage of the fault current (up to 9S% for cable line consisting of three single core cables) will returns via the cable sheaths due to their strong inductive coupling with the phase conductors [7] .
Obviously, it is clear that there is a variation in the magnitude of fault current returning to the substation earth grid considering the two configurations. Hence, the choice of a similar split factor for the two systems may lead to an error in design. In this paper, a distribution substation earth grid was in [8] . The soil resistivity field data was used to determine the soil model using RESAP module. Note that in this paper, the earth grid was designed using SESCAD and executed in MALT. The earth grid resistance Rg and area occupied by the grid was initially estimated using equation (1) where a dimension of 2Smx2Sm was considered, which yielded a value of Rg <SQ as recommended in [9] . The grid comprised of six parallel horizontal rows and columns of copper conductors occupying an area of 62Sm 2 • The value of the short circuit current available at the secondary terminals of the upstream transformer was calculated using equations (2a) and (2b) which produced a current of 7873A which may result when a bolted three phase fault occurs between the upstream and downstream substations. This value was used as the initial energization current representing 100% of the fault current flowing into the earth grid. A fault clearing time of 0.3s which is the minimum time threshold that would trigger ventricular fibrillation was used. The grid was redesigned using the same dimension each time and successively energized with 7S%, SO% and 2S% of the fault current assumed to flow into the grid while the complimentary percentages of the fault current were assumed to return to the source [10] . The substation safety criteria were studied under three scenarios for each value of the fault current. The cases were no surface layer material, with surface layer material of resistivity 3000Q-m, and with surface layer material of resistivity SOOOQ-m.
Where.
Rg is the grid resistance in Q. p is the soil resistivity in Q-m A is the area occupied by the grid in m 2 . 
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III.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION These field data were used as inputs to the RESAP module for a soil model to be determined which is presented in Table 2 .
Note that this is the initial step in the design of any substation earth grid and has to be done as accurate as possible. The third, i.e. the bottom soil layer has the lowest value of soil resistivity of 35.60-m with an infinite thickness. In summary, the soil model is made of three layers with high resistivity layer sandwiched between two low resistivity layers. Ideally, the earth grid could have been buried in the third layer to take advantage of the lower soil resistivity, however, it was recommended in [10] that the burial depth of earth grids should vary between 0.5 to 1.5m, as such a burial depth of 0.5m was adopted for this design which implies that the earth grid would be buried in the top soil layer. Step voltage profile for 100% fault current Step voltage profile for 50% fault current Step voltage profile for 25% fault current Table 3 lists the safety criteria for earth grid designed without surface layer material resistivity for various percentages of energization current. It was discovered that the value of Rg is similar for all fault current variations, as the grid were similar in terms of area occupied, dimensions and the number of buried conductors in the grid. It was also revealed that the EPR as a result of 100% fault current was higher, while the step and touch voltages were lower with typical values of 19,302V, 508.6V and 271.4V, respectively. Considering the 75%, 50% and 25% of fault currents, it was observed that, although the EPR for each percentage of fault current was different, typically, 14,477, 9,652 and 4,825V, respectively, 766 the step and touch voltages were exactly the same, which are 893.3 and 367.6V, respectively for all the three fault currents applied.
The safety criteria for the earth grid designed with surface layer material of resistivity 3000Q-m is presented in Table 4 .
Results indicate that for 100% fault current, the step and touch voltages were lower with values of 3098.7 and 919V, respectively, while for 75%, 50% and 25% fault currents, the values of step and touch voltages were similar for all three fault currents and higher than the step and touch voltages of the case for 100% fault current. A similar scenario could also be observed in Table 5 , for the surface layer material of resistivity 5000Q-m, in which the step and touch voltages due to 100% fault current were seen to be lower than those from 75%, 50% and 25%, fault currents. It is worth to note that, EPR is proportional to fault current magnitude and the value of Rg, but there is no direct relationship between fault current magnitude, the value of Rg, and step and touch voltages. However, higher values of EPR are known to influence touch and step voltages. Visual inspection of equations (4) and (5) 
The impact of split factor value on safety criteria of substation earth grid has been presented. Three cases of safety criteria were considered, i.e. without surface layer material, with surface layer material of resistivity 3000Q-m, and with surface material of resistivity 5000Q-m. The energization current was splitted into 100%, 75%, 50% and 25% to investigate its effect on the safety criteria. It was found that the step and touch voltages as a result of lOO% fault current were lower than those from 75%, 50% and 25% although with a slight margin but enough to cause harm. It could be deduced from the results obtained in this paper that, since the step and touch voltage magnitudes for 75%, 50%, and 25% fault current are all the same, the choice of 75% fault current flowing to the grid and 25% returning to the source is recommended with little error and could not lead to the overestimation or underestimation of the grid geometric parameters.
